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24 The African Experience
By Ng'weno Osolo-Nasubo
Political development in Africa has gone
through various stages in different states
during the last two decades. Often this
development entailed high hopes as well
as disappointments. And as the new lead-
ers of Africa embarked on the search for
a political system ideally suited to trans-
form the socio-economic and post-colo-
nial political ills facing their citizens, a
wave of "isms" spread across the conti-
nent. Concepts such as "African Social-
ism," "Nkrumahism" and "Pragmatic So-
cialism" were expounded to politically-
unsophisticated citizens whose total
loyalty to these concepts was demanded.
Along with this emerged the concept of
one-party versusmuIti-partysystem,wh ich
the colonialists had created and promoted
on the eve of independence to insure
"Parliamentary Democracy."
To some non-African watchers (notably
Western Europeans), African traditional
communalism, to which the African lead-
ers constantly referred in their search for
a new socio-economic and pol itical order,
became equated with Eastern European
communism.
Meanwhile, African governments, pre-
occupied with socio-economic problems
facing their people, sought assistance
from extemal govemments and multina-
tional corporations. While big powers
sought to fight their ideological battles on
the African continent, the Africans soon
discovered how they might take advan-
tage of both sides. But some nations were
hurt in the process, both politically and
economically.
The Beginning
To dwell on the origin of African political
development, such a study would compel
one to take intellectual and mental flight
back to the pre-slave and pre-colonial
epochs, when Africa had politically orga-
nized itself and had created great king-
doms and empires (e.g. Ghana, Kush,
Mali, Songhai, Soudan, Zimbabwe).
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y, more than ever, the world is
- ed with both realism and contra-
s: A world of "have-less" exceed-
_ . outnumbering the "have-plenty," a
~ of strong political and economic
and development known as "su-
-=:..-.nlAlers,"and another world known by
such as: primitive, undeveloped,
eveloped, developing, ThirdWorld.
last entities do not as yet fit or qual-
the definition of the common word
r" -let alone "super-power." There
ite world, and a non-white world; a
of the few super-rich (pol itically and
:::::n>lmically) controlling the destinies of
erging nations of the world.
where is this realism more seriously
nced than in Africa (although one
comparable problems in Asia and
America). The African situation is
more complex and precarious than
-= :Jihersprimarily due to the continent's
sand disjointed historicity; and the
of her resources by centuries of slave
"" and the emergence of colonial he-
y and imperialism.
enAfricans real ized (during colonial
-00) that they were socially, politically
=. economically impoverished and were
oolitically free, they sought to achieve
ical freedom as a prelude to all other
oms. But the search for a cohesive
faced insurmountable difficulties
were predicated upon the vertical
- . ion of the ethnic population, and the
ion of unviable colonial enclaves;
also, due to the compounded ab-
of political education among the
~ rity of the African population.
evertheless, when a few Africans took
-- charge to organize the masses, the
:=-Drresponded enthusiastically because
e colonial pressure on the one hand
the envisaged unity promising them
ange from that pressure on the other.
in a very short time, Africans rallied
placed the colonial governments in
=. state' of siege. Apparently, when the
nial authorities in the Metropolitan
ernments learned what the Africans
e up to, they quickly suggested "a ne-
gotiated settlement." But little did the
African participants at independence con-
ferences know that the colonialists had
indeed already worked out a politico-eco-
nomic formula advantageous only to
themselves. Therefore, when the inde-
pendence instruments were ceremoni-
ously handed, the Africans got only a bare
bone, while the flesh and marrow had
been retained by the ex-colonialists.
Economic dominance and pursuit for
wider markets for finished (manufactured)
goods brought about both economic and
pol itical imperial ism- thus prompting
slavery, colonialism and now neo-colo-
nialism. Further, politics has always been
applied either as a weapon or as a ladder
with which to achieve an economic goal;
once that goal is achieved, politics is
again used as a shield with which to pro-
tect the achieved economic objective.
Independence Constitutions:
"Parliamentary Democracy"-
Governments without Power
In Politics Among Nations, Hans Morgen-
thau defines political power as "the psy-
chological control over the minds of men."
In the case ofAfrica, this control was firmly
entrenched in the independence consti-
tutions of the new nations.
Constitutions that were drafted by co-
lonial powers as a pre-condition for po-
Iitical freedom became the framework for
independence. For example, the consti-
tutions provided for a colonial minority
representation and rigid requirements for
amendments-aimed at protecting expa-
triates from "expropriation of their prop-
erty." Taken together, these constitutions
thus firmly closed the channels that the
African majority governments might have
used to introduce massive economic pri-
orities, including land reform and owner-
ship. For example, the constitutions of
Kenya and Nigeria, and the presently pro-
posed constitution for Zimbabwe (Rho-
desia), state categorically that:
The Constitution will contain provisions
("the Bill of Rights") on the lines of those
in the Constitutions of other recently in-
dependent Commonwealth countries, 25
protecting fundamental human rights
and freedoms ... this will confer protec-
tion from expropriation of property ex-
cept on specified grounds of public in-
terest and even then only on condition
that there is prompt payment of ade-
quate compensation and that the whole
compensation may be remitted abroad
free from any deduction, charge or tax
made or levied in respect of its remis-
sion.
The "Bill of Rights" provision forbidding
expropriation of property that was undem-
ocratically acquired during colonial rule,
particularly land, guarantees the continu-
ation of the unequal distribution of wealth
between theAfrican majority arid the Euro-
pean minority. It sustains thedevelopment
of the European sector, while continuing
to hinder the development of the Africans
on a large scale. More than that, the "Bill
of Rights" provision allowing the remis-
sion of cash compensation abroad without
restrictions or tax is indeed an example
of howAfrican governments are burdened
with a critical lack of foreign exchange.
This lack of foreign exchange continues
to plague many governments into pol itical
instability.
Jacob Oser, in his book,Promoting Eco-
nomic Deve/opment- With Illustrations
from Kenya, writes about a related consti-
tutional clause to compensate expatriate
civil servants in Kenyawho wished to tem-
porarily leave government service:
When Africans took over from the Euro-
peans, the question of what to do about
the foreign civil servants arose. The new
regime wanted most of them to stay on,
but many were not inclined to do so.
Both the few who were dismissed and
the many who wanted to leave were of-
fered compensation ... so attractive that
most European civil servants, even if
they had wanted to remain in Kenya and
work for the new regime, quit their jobs,
took their termination pay, and imme-
diately accepted other government po-
sitions-Ail these payments were and
26 are of course, convertible into sterling
in London. No wonder this is called in
Kenya the 'golden handshake', a sweet
way to be bid adieu.
The retention of former colonial civil
servants (both European expatriates and
local bureaucrats) by governments in the
developing nations of Africa has contrib-
uted tremendously to the socia-political
and economic instability in Africa. Al-
though most of the expatriates are not pri-
mari Iy pol itical opportun ists, nevertheless,
they are economically inclined. They all
cap ita Iize on the fri nge expe rience ga ined
during the colonial period to further their
socio-economic ambitions. They are not
too keen about changing the direction of
their countries' socio-economic transfor-
mation that would encompass most or all
the people. They "are committed to cap-
italism because of their background, their
Western education, and their shared ex-
perience and enjoyment of positions of
privilege. They are mesmerised by capi-
talist institutions and organizations. They
ape the way of life of their old colonial
masters, and are determined to preserve
the status and power inherited from them,"
wrote Kwame Nkrumah in Class Struggle
in Africa.
Most of the expatriates were colonial
diehards, conservative farmers and busi-
nessmen sympathetic to colonialism.
Moreover, more complications were
added to this episode when African gov-
ments entrusted these people with ex-
tremely significant responsibilities. For
example, a few of them became senior
advisors and executives in matters involv-
ing politico-economic policy. In Kenya, for
instance, former spokesmen of the die-
hard European settlers were appointed to
Parliament-some into President Jomo
Kenyatta's cabinet - and as senior judges.
But more often than not, they were unwi 11-
ing to give unqualified support to the Afri-
can govemments they served. Nkrumah,
in Ghana: The Autobiography of Kwame
Nkrumah, recounts how his government
experienced similar problems:
It did not escape my notice that where
the administrative service was con-
cerned, if a policy was laid down for the
officials by the Government with which
they disagreed, means were adopted,
by subterfuge or otherwise, towreck that
policy-It happened too often for it to
be a coincidence that whenever gov-
ernment policy was to be put into effect,
the officials either dilly-dallied or saw
that nothing was done about it.
The same thesis is reiterated by Jack
Woddis in Introduction to Neo-Coloni-
alism:
Theremay be some former colonial of-
ficials who sincerely wish to assist the
new states, but the majority of them,
whatever may be their views, are willy-
nilly part of the imperialist establish-
ment which trained them,moulded their
outlook and continues to retain them
precisely because they are still able to
render a service.
Rapid Development Approach Versus
Gradual Approach
The attainment of political independence
in Africa was viewed by the African
masses as a prelude to the struggle ulti-
mately aimed at the eradication of the
social and economic ills left behind by
the former empire-builders. The masses
yearned for quick solutions to a multitude
of problems emanating, for the most part,
from the lack of proper education, ab-
sence of infrastructural faci Iities, nutri-
tional food, housing, clothing, employ-
ment, equal treatment and, above all, the
return and redistribution of land.
Nearly all African political leaders un-
derstood these basic needs. However, the
manner in which to achieve them pre-
sented the hardest obstac Ie; for it was not
until a little while later that they realized
the above needs or fruits of independence
could not be easily achieved because of
colonial contradictions and, if one may
add, thesocio-economic and political
ideologies of colonizers, versus African
nationalism.
Education: as Colonizers'
Ideological Weapon
Education in Africa during colonialperi
was influenced by the spirit of racial d·
crimination, just as all other aspects
colonial life. Whereas all children of
ruling settler group had cornprehensi :=
and well-developed educational facitities
and proper curricula, the African childrer
were simply looked upon and laughed a;
-as though they were "Charlie Brown
cartoons. In other words, Africans werE
depicted as educational sub-normals.
All European children were providec
with professional kind of education ano
enough funds duly allocated for that pur-
pose, but the Africans were required ~
pay "school fees." Also, they were sub-
jected to rudimentary and irrelevant kinds
of education that did not prepare then:
for the task of nation-building, before ane
even after independence. For example.
whereas Europeans and other foreigners
(e.g. Asians in East and Central Africa,
were encouraged to study medicine, en-
gineering and business, Africans were
encouraged to memorize foreign religious
beliefs and practices without permissio
to question their meaning and validity.
Young Africans spent more time study-
ing the history and geography of the
world, especially of Europe and the Amer-
icas. This curriculum was saturated with
glorious Western Europe under the Popes,
the renaissance and the reformation-un-
doubtedly with a lot of exaggeration. Afri-
cans were led to bel ieve that it was impor-
tant to memorize William Shakespeare's
plays, know a great deal about the One
Hundred Years' War of the Roses, Oliver
Cromwell, Napoleon Bonaparte, Alex-
ander "the Great," Captain James Cook,
the Battle of Waterloo, the United States
and the French Wars of independence,
Louis XIV and Louis XVI, Hitler and the
Jews, the War of Jenkin's Ear, and most
preposterously, King Leopold of Belgium
as the divine owner of the Congo.
Nothing of substance was mentioned
about the Great African kingdoms, and
the Europeans' involvement in the slave 27
trade, except to glorify Europeans as the
pioneers who struggled and brought the
slave trade to an end. Africans were fur-
ther led to believe that the Europeans
were superior, and their culture and con-
tinent represented the earthly heaven.
Thus, the Europeans were mandated by
the Creator to "colonize" and "civilize"
the "primitive" non-white races. In this re-
spect, the African was totally mis-edu-
cated, and this process contributed to his
belief in his own inferiority; and later to
his political instability.
In French and Portuguese colonies, as-
similation (assimilado) became the basis
of education. The curriculum emphasized
the acceptance of European culture as
the basis of the "civilized" life, and the re-
jection or forsaking of African culture,
which formed the basis for the "primitive"
life.
Another devastating obstacle to Afri-
cans' educational advancement was the
result of colonial governments' policy of
systematic elimination of young Africans
from school at the early or primary stage.
Under this policy, called "superannua-
tion," which did not apply to Europeans
and other foreign students, indiscriminate
turnovers became the order of the educa-
tional system.
("Superannuation," a policy aimed at
ensuring Europeans and other non-Afri-
cans of abundant and unlirnited semi-
skilled labor, was recommended to the
colonial government of Kenya by the
Archbishop of East arid Central Africa,
The Rt. Rev. Leonard J. Beecher. It stated
that in the event an African pupil failed in
European language(s) (i.e. English or
French), the student in question would
automatically be withdrawn from school
regardless of the results or perfomiance
in other courses. Under this policy, repe-
tition in either course or examination was
outlawed. This policy later spread
throughout colonial Africa. As a result, the
youngsters thus affected by this pol icy
ended up auctioning their labor power on
28 European farms and/or factories gather-
ingraw materials for export; others la-
bored in non-African [e.g. Asian, Arab]
commercial stores doing domestic work,
and other back-breaking jobs while others
enlisted in the colonial army, police and
prisons. And those who did not find work
ended up in untold misery. For further de-
tails, see N. Osolo-Nasubo, A Socio-Eco-
nomic Study of the KenyaHighlands, from
1900-1970: A Case Study of the Uhuru
Government. Chapter 111, pp. 64-112.)
Along with this, was the stigma attached
to manual work. Agriculture and other
manual occupations were viewed as ca-
reers of the "unintelligent" or "stupid"
people. This stigma was re-enforced par-
ticu larly by the punishment often imposed
on an African student for whatever reason
or mistake committed by the student (e.g.
arriving late for class, failing given tests,
or appearing in rags). The punishment so
imposed was, more often than not, related
to performing somework in the field: such
as cultivating or cutting grass. Psycho-
logically, therefore, African youths grew
up despising rural life, and every youth
struggled to the utmost to pass the nu-
merous examinations prepared in the
Metropole so that hewouId eventually mi-
grate to urban centers in search of rudi-
mentary socia-economic salvation.
Despite this limited education, one ba-
sic advantage the system had was its em-
phasis on liberal education as opposed
to technical and/or science education.
This system was tailored upon the princi-
ple of comprehensive essay type of ex-
aminations, which fortunately prepared
young Africans· to think and reason com-
prehensively. Simi larly, the encourage-
ment of Africans to study lawextolled their
thinking and reasoning process. A few
African students went abroad, and while
there, new ideas and philosophies devel-
oped and crystallized. This was later ex-
pressed in speeches and writings-most
of which were intended to put in proper
perspective the African history and tradi-
tion, the repudiation of colonialism, and
call for self-determination and independ-
ence.
Upon independence, the new African
leaders realized that in order to forge
ahead socially and economically, a policy
designed to combat illiteracy must be ele-
vated highest on the order of priorities.
Many states resolved to broaden educa-
tional facilities by offering free education.
Although this was received somewhat
positively, nonetheless, some leaders
have made rather more serious mistakes
than the colonialists. In Kenya, for in-
stance, private school fees have skyrock-
etted since independence, especially in
the former European schools. As a result,
only the children of politicians and
wealthy businessmen are able to afford
the cost. Coupled with this blunder is the
policy of offering free education at the
university level. In essence, it is Iike trying
to buiId a house starting with the roof
while neglecting the foundation.
The Search for Rapid Socio-Economic
and Political Development (ISMS)
Compounded with ever rising frustrations
among the masses, African political lead-
ers resolved that political slogans used
during the struggle for independence had
already served their purpose. They had to
be catalogued and kept in the archives,
and serious considerations given to the
provision of social amenities. To some
African leaders, the problem was not
merely confined to district, national or re-
gional level; it was seen as too com-
pounded and too formidable to be tackled
singly or in isolation. Therefore, first the
struggle was to be linked to the issues of
identity and the crisis of economic de-
velopment.
The search for a scientific system or ap-
proach that would offer rapid solution to
the compounded socia-economic and po-
litical ills in Africa soon became the
ideological battleground, chiefly between
Western capitalist adherents (both local
and abroad) on the one hand, and East-
ern socialist admirers on the other.
To most Africans, Europe was associ-
ated with slavery and colonialism. It WaE
a period of desperate search for an alter-
native system that would offer a stronc
hand in regaining the traditional Afric~
communal life and personality, guardec.
with the managing of the means of pro-
duction and distribution of resources.Wi'
this spirit, most African leaders preferroo
the socialist approach-for it derives from
the communalism and humanism of tra-
ditional Africa. This system was given
several names by several leaders, for
example: "African Socialism," by Jomo
Kenyatta; "Ujamma," by Julius Nyerere;
"Nkrumahism," by Kwame Nkrumah;
"Communaucracy," bySekou Toure; "Ne-
gritude," by Leopold Senghor; "L'homme
personnaliste," by Mamadou Dia.
Nyerere, in Ujamma: Essays on Social-
ism, asserted that:
'Ujamaa,' then, or 'Familyhood,' de-
scribes our socialism. It is opposed to
capitalism, which seeks to build a hap-
py society on the basis of the exploita-
tion of man by man- Modern African
socialism can draw from its traditional
heritage the recognition of 'society' as.
an extension of the basic family unit.
Nkrumah, one of the great theorists and
an eloquent philosopher on the African
political scene drew great attention to so-
cialism (scientific socialism), and what it
could, if adopted, offer Africa. He rea-
soned:
Socialism is the only pattern that can
within the shortest possible time bring
the good life to the people. For social-
ism assumes the public ownership of
the means of production-the land and
its resources-and the use of those
means for production that will bring
benefit to the people. (from African So-
cialism, by William Friedland and Carl
Rosberg, Jr.).
Capitalism, therefore, became synony-
mous With slavery, colonialism, elitism
(class and/or social and economic strati-
- ), and neo-colonialism. The rna-
of Africans reject capitalism be-
it breeds individualism (as op-
o Africa's communal ismorvi Ilage-
o Africans, individualism breeds
ness, family disintegration, per-
greed and, therefore, misery. Capi-
-= , hence, is viewed as a threat to the
- - al of African traditional pillars of
_ e.g. the concept of land ownership,
=- ed family, method of choosing
and polygyny (or polygamy), rules
- seccession and inheritance.
~ it became difficult to introduce so-
ISITl on a massive scale to take the
- of capitalism. This complication
predicated upon many contradic-
For one thing, Western capitalists
had invested in colonial Africa
id not withdraw either their capital
nnel at the eve of independence.
colonial governments, along with
leaders and European settlers,
to a constitutional framework that
= protection-thus giving the capi-
-= a strong hand in the management
means of production and distribu-
, ~oods and services.
eover, since the colonial authorities
relinquished a "shadow" but retained
-= "substance." it became impossible
~newAfrican governrnents to change
-elations ofWestern colonial-capitalist
and its form of production. This
lication was further predicated upon
factual variables alluded to earlier:
-'= the new government's retention of
- colonial civil service, and European
- r personnel of the armed forces; sec-
the Africans' acceptance of rig id
.:. unworkable constitution during nego-
- - n for independence.
e battle, therefore, shifted on the ac-
- ition of capital that would neither be
lIy capitalistic nor communistic (for
latter was said to be associated with
- denial of basic human rights; e.g. race
racism). Again and again, the West
cmmered hard on this question of "basic
an rights" in socialist countries, par-
larly the Soviet Union (as though the
colonialists themselves were champions
of human equality). African leaders re-
sponded to this propaganda chiefly be-
cause of colonial experience involving
race and racism. In other words, Africans
could not in any way embrace commu-
nism-an ideology also associated with
racism, the gravest menace partly respon-
sible for both slavery and colonialism.
The acquisition and control of capital
investment in Africa has dominated Afri-
can pol itics since the late 1950sand early
19pOs,when most African states attained
political independence. It has drawn both
the West and the East into a stronger com-
petition for economic superiority all over
the world. Africans, not wanting to be en-
tangled in East-Westcold war politics, re-
solved to develop their nations from the
neutral position, bearing in mind an old
proverb: "When two bull elephants fight,
it is the grass that suffers most."
Private investment (capitalism) and
public enterprise (socialism) as separate
and distinct political and economic sys-
tems continue to dorninate African politi-
cal and economic development.
But most Africans prefer scientific so-
cialism to capitalism, because the former
offers elements deep-rooted in the African
traditional social structure,which calls for
communal ownership of land and the con-
cept of extended family.
One Party Vs. Multi-Party Systems
Immediately following independence, the
new African governments realized that
the rhetoric, the quest for unity and sup-
port they had sought and received during
the heyday of political struggle for inde-
pendence from colonial bondage could
no longer be guaranteed unless the ever
rising socio-economic frustrations were
solved once and for all.
The politicians quietly acknowledged
that these frustrations could not be solved,
primarily due to the socio-economic and
political framework they and their ex-
colonial governments and settler-busi-
nessmen had agreed to. New slogans
were therefore immediately created as a 29
means to conceal their embarrassment,
weakness and, above all, their failure to
fulfill the rhetorical promises.
For instance, in Kenya, the old slogan
"Uhuru na Mashamba" (freedom and ex-
propriation of the highlands from the
European settlers) was substituted with
"Uhuru na Kazi" (freedom and work); in
Tanzania, the emphasis shifted from
"Uhutu na Kazi" to "Uhuru na Umoja"
(Freedom and Unity); in Ghana, "Freedom
and Unity" was substituted with "Work
and Happiness," while in Cameroon "Uni-
ficacion Imediate" was replaced with
"Paix Travail Patrie" (Peace-Work-Father-
land).
The emphasis, therefore, was on "Unity
and Hard Work"-without which the new
governments could not guarantee their
survival. This became apparent as mem-
bers of the "opposition" got busy accus-
ing the new governments of political na-
ivete and impotence. The opposition felt
they too had participated in the struggle
for independence and were entitled to an
equal share of the fruits of independence.
This they had been denied by their for-
mer colleagues who had, by sheer chance,
been successful in forming the first gov-
ernment. Being furious and angry, the
opposition held nuts and bolts politics
around the country (or countries) telling
the people how the government had lied
to the rnasses by fai Iing to honor pre-in-
dependence promises. Fearing possible
negative consequences, most govern-
ments reacted by banning the opposition
party (or parties).
Role of the Opposition
Under colonialisrn, the role of an opposi-
tion party (or parties) was not quite under-
stood by the Africans who always were at
the fringes of the power structure. Under
British colonial practice, for example, the
government successfully operated on the
prernise of lawand order. Seniormembers
of the opposition party's "shadow cabi-
net" (who were all Europeans) were in
constant touch with the government-par-
30 ticularly onmatters involving major policy,
e.g. forced labor,African taxes, racial seg-
regation (in schools, employment, hous-
ing, etc.), and appropriation of African
land.
Although some colonialists were in the
opposition, nevertheless, they were al-
ways considered part of the colon ial struc-
ture. Consequently, they were constantly
kept posted by the sitting governrnent or
administrator of the new policy under
consideration.
The new African governments fai led to
continue with this procedure or practice.
And government policy was kept from the
opposition, except in parliamentary de-
bate over common concerns. Even then,
a lot of shouting and heckling-mostly
by "governments' back-benchers" - pre-
vented logic and/or reason to prevail. It
has even been charged that some
speeches and documents given in African
Parliaments were actually written by for-
eign "advisors." (For example, the Kenya
Government's "Sessional Paper No. 10:
African Social ism. ")
When the governments were advocating
unity and hard work, some members of the
opposition traded on inter-ethnic ani-
mosity ("tribalism") and, also, capitalized
on the governments' lack of proper plan-
ning and allocation of resources. More
criticism was directed toward govern-
ments' poor performanc,e, coupled with
massive accumulation of land and other
property. Approval to these charges was
echoed by the masses, and the govern-
ments became angry. Soon the govern-
ments labeled the opposition as "dissi-
dent groups" and "enemies."
To make matters worse, some members
of the opposition (at times a majority of
them),misunderstood their role in politics.
Most of them regarded their responsibility
as that of "opposing" whatever policy or
program the government introduced.
Competition, jealousy, and oratory over-
rode reason and logic.
The rulers, after a long while, charged
that the opposition was not participating
I
search for solutions to the many
is of nation-building. Because the
rs of the opposition in parliament
=-:::.'v.!:.,-l salaries (from national budget),
ere accused by the ruling group of
~ a "do-nothing" group and an "ex-
-=--c:::"""" luxury."
opposition was also seen as lack-
agents for ideological contest and
..••..•.._.o,"'ionwhich, with the aid from multi-
- Icorporations, neo-colonial aswell
- ::::::mmunistpowers and/or their agen-
Id resort to iIleg itimate means for
row of the party legitimately in
eopold Senghor argued in Na-
----.,W'V'/ and the African Road to Social-
- opposition is tempted to place it-
- i, under the pretext of ideology, at
:-e service of the foreigner-the oppo-
-;;ion parties are teleguided from the
- zside .... :
example, those in power in Africa
Iy cooperate with or consult the op-
--on on the identification and alloca-
of national priorities, distribution of
- ies (particularly key ministries).
ant budgetary considerations and
- ocations are planned and carried out
~ small number of self-conceited indi-
- Is, who pay more attention to the
_;lee from the expatriate "advisors"
knowledge of the continent's needs
priorities- particularly in the rural
~- rs- is very limited.
~ most African states, key ministries-
-- se, economic planning, attorney
_- eral, state, commerce and industry,
foreiqn affairs-have often been allo-
tomembers of the president's ethnic
:: p (Kenya is a case in point) on the
xt of ethnic loyalty. Therefore, certain
ions of the nation are systematically
-x: edin programs of economic devel-
ent. And the citizens in those areas
-obliged to conclude that the country's
= ers do not consider them on the same
-ng with the ethnic group of whom the
- n's president is a member. This treat-
of subserviency has indeed forced
some ethnic groups to advocate seces-
sion or irredentism. Forexample, the prob-
lem of ethnic Somalis in Ethiopia and in
northern Kenya and also that of Eritrea
may have been predicated by this kind of
treatment.
The desire to retain power indefinitely
is certainly a factor in the problems and
constraints of African political develop-
ment. African presidents and ministers
(especially those in the key ministries),
tend to hold on to their offices for life-
regardless of manifest incompetence and
even extremely advanced age. Because
some of these leaders have suffered im-
prisonment in the hands of colonialists,
they feel the new nation owes them an
ever-lasting political and economic
reward.
The Military and Politics
The colonial governments, seeking to run
the colonies with uninterrupted power
(power at equilibrium), most often se-
lected African men to join the colonial
armed forces, mainly from the most dis-
advantaged ethnic groups. And although
these people played no significant roles
in decision or policy making during colo-
nial period, they knew that their European
bosses were kept in close touch and con-
sultation by the sitting colonial govern-
ment. Inotherwords, top men in the armed
forces were regarded as equal partners in
the sharing of colonial authority and the
fruits of colonialism.
On the eve of independence, or soon
after,many of these Africans who for years
had served in the colonial military and po-
lice structure expected to be promoted to
"officer" or "inspector" rank (promotion
through experience) by virtue of the fact
that their nation(s) had achieved inde-
pendence. Further, they also looked for-
ward to the time when they would be con-
sulted by the new African leaders on poli-
cies or matters of national security and
importance. However, African govern-
ments, still preoccupied with the colonial
psychosis of neglecting those without
formal education, and the false notion of 31
"white is always right," failed to promote
the African officers soon enough.
After political independence, the Afri-
can members of the armed forces-ex-
cluded from economic participation-
watched with frustration and desperation
those at the top of political echelon
abound in wealth, while the incomes of
the armed forces personnel remained
virtually unimproved (bearing in mind that
these people's emoluments orwages were
among the lowest during colonial period).
Consequently, they acted in concert with
some members of opposition party (or
parties), and revolted by overthrowing the
sitting government.
When this move was successfully car-
ried out, a justification was given by the
new forces in power: that the deposed
government, together with the political
machinery had proved unworkable and,
therefore, a change of the existing order
was justified.
It must be noted, however, that military
rulers,especially those who replaced pro-
gressive governments, have hindered the
"revolutionary" changes in the neo-colo-
nial economic order. This was the case of
the 1966 coup in Ghana, which deposed
Nkrumah.
Another aspect involves former colonial
governments' directly intervening militar-
ily to put down any form of military take-
over of an existing government whose
socio-economic and political direction
and performance meet overwhelming ap-
proval of the former colonial power. This
was the case, for example, in Senegal in
1962, Niger in 1963, Gabon, Kenya, Tan-
ganyika, Uganda and Zanzibar in 1964.
The catalyst for mil itary takeover of
power in young African nations can be ex-
plained in terms of class struggle in the
new nations, busily searching for (new)
answers to the ever growing socio-eco-
nomic and political frustrations and im-
poverishment. This new quest is predi-
cated upon the numerous failures result-
ing from the old colonial-capitalist path.
32 COUpSd'etat in Africa should therefore be
understood as a process through which
young nations are still plagued with com-
plex contradictions and problems of na-
tion-building.
Multi-National Corporations and
International Monetary Agencies
Since economics was the chief cause of
colonialism, the colonies' economy was
thus tied to that of the colonizer countries.
This meant that the colonies' primary re-
sponsibilitywas to produce rawmaterials
for feeding and sustaining the machines
in the Metropole, and to provide markets
for poorly manufactured "treaty" goods.
Rene Dumont observed in False Start in
Africa:
In December of 1949, in northern Congo
(then Belgium), I picked up an alarm
clock I wanted to buy in a little Greek
shop. The proprietor quickly grabbed it
out of my hands, saying: "That's a treaty
article, it only works for a few days." But
it was sold to the Congolese at the same
price as good European clocks."
As a result, the colonies were not indus-
trialized. Industrialization, rather than ag-
riculture, Africans argue, is the only per-
pendicular road to the eradication of the
socio-economic and political ills accrued
and abandoned bydeparted colonial gov-
ernments. This undertaking, however, re-
quires enormous capital investment. Al-
though Africa has the capital resources
(most of it still untapped), it does not as
yet have the means necessary to mobilize
its accumulation and utilization. Conse-
quently, developed nations of both the
East and the West have been approached
by African governments for assistance in
this regard.
While both the East and the West have
responded with some degree of appre-
hension and sympathy, politics-as a
concentrated expression of economics-
has often dominated the economic inten-
tion by the would-be financiers. Themulti-
national corporations of Western Europe
and the United States, aided in part by
ional monetary agencies (e.g. The
- Bank, The International Monetary
gency for International Oevelop-
10), the United Nations, Chemical
Barclays Bank, Banque de France,
Beige, Oppenheimer's Anglo
--~-""n Corporation), have a monopoly
I as the power to exert political and
:::r-...--nomicinfluence over the selection of
ent in Africa.
~ African. politicians are reminded
:.;:;q>aration spokesmen that the eco-
development of Africa seems im-
Ie without financial and technologi-
capital which can only come from
• meaning from the West. Because
sstill produce what they do not
e (chiefly export-oriented raw ma-
s), and consume what they do not
e (import-oriented), they often pay
attention to such advice.
ign capital investment is not only a
of enhancing development, it is
and importantly so) a mode of real-
_ high rates of profit. As a result, big
-.."ninvestors, before committing them-
to invest their capital, first prefer to
aranteed by African governments
conditions that will provide such prof-
- rthermore, assurance involving com-
tion for loss of future profits is
t in the event of political changes
as nationalization of investment, re-
ess of the amount of capital and the
- - of return at the time.
id Apter and Louis Wolf Goodman,
rs of The Multi-national Corporation
Social Change, noted the following
cteristics usually employed by mul-
- nal corporations in host countries:
__Corporations have demanded guar-
- ees of police action against the for-
tion of unions or the arrest of princi-
union militants as preconditions for
tablishing a plant in a host country ...
-0 opportunity to adjust prices so that
bulk of the product's value accrues
-- er to the host country, the tax haven,
- the country of destination, depending
which is most advantageous to the
zoipotetion.
A few years ago, the leading interna-
tional financing institution (World Bank)
rejected requests for loans from member-
nations of Egypt, Tanzania and Zambia to
construct the Aswan Dam and the Tan-
zanian-Zambian Railroad, respectively. In
both instances, the respective govern-
ments were advised that the proposed
projects were not economically viable.
And when these governments turned to
Eastern nations as a last resort, the West-
ern nations were quick to charge that
these governments "had gone red."
It would appear, at times, that the multi-
national corporations and international
monetary agencies as peculiarly being
more destructive to the African pol itical
process than are helpful in building and
strengthen ing that process. Equ ipped with
capital and personnel, the foreign enter-
prises influence African pol itical process
-like a remote control mechanism-in
pursuit of their own selfish ends.
Given the fact that little, if anything, has
been done by the African governments to
positively respond to the pre-independ-
ence promises and expectations, to re-
lieve the poverty and impoverishment of
the overwhelming majority of their under-
privileged peasants in rural areas, and
little could be expected under the ongo-
ing policy of pouring most of the invest-
ment and other resources in urban centers,
both civilian and military governments
will continue to experience turn-overs.
Therefore, the future political develop-
ment in Africa will continue to undergo
this metamorphic experience until the
Africans themselves as a whole (or at
least a majority) first undergo mental
decolonization, followed by political and
economic unity through union government
in the same manner that the majority of
Americans and the Soviets saw the logic
of forging their states and republics into
respective unions. D
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